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Abstract. Access control is key to limiting the actions of users in an
application and attribute-based policy languages such as XACML allow
to express a wide range of access rules. As these policy languages become
more widely used, policies grow both in size and complexity. Modularity
and reuse are key to specifying and managing such policies effectively.
Ideally, complex or domain-specific policy patterns are defined once and
afterwards instantiated by security experts in their application-specific
policies. However, current policy languages such as XACML provide only
limited features for modularity and reuse. To address this issue, we intro-
duce policy templates as part of a novel attribute-based policy language
called STAPL. Policy templates are policies containing unbound vari-
ables that can be specified when instantiating the template in another
policy later on. STAPL supports four types of policy templates with in-
creasing complexity and expressiveness. This paper illustrates how these
policy templates can be used to define reusable policy patterns and val-
idates that policy templates are an effective means to simplify the spec-
ification of large and complex attribute-based policies.
Keywords: Access control, access control policies, attribute-based
access control, reuse, modularity, policy templates.
1 Introduction
Access control is an important part of application-level security that constrains
the actions of authenticated subjects on the resources in the application by
enforcing access rules. Traditionally, access control was tightly coupled with
the application code, making both hard to maintain. To address this, policy-
based access control separates the access rules from the application code into
declarative access control policies [15]. This approach improves modifiability
by allowing the access rules to vary without having to change the application
code. This approach also benefits separation of concerns by allowing application
developers to focus on writing application code and security experts on specifying
the access control policies in separate software modules.
However, while policy-based access control facilitates separation of concerns
between application logic and access control logic, the challenge now is to effec-
tively specify and manage the access control policies themselves. For example,
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When a sub j e c t t r i e s to view the d e t a i l e d s t a tu s o f a p a t i e n t :
1 . Deny i f the sub j e c t i s not a nurse .
2 . Deny i f the owning pat i en t has withdrawn consent f o r the
subject , un l e s s the s t a tu s o f the pat i en t i s c r i t i c a l or
i f the sub j e c t has t r i g g e r e d breaking−the−g la s s , which
should be logged .
3 . Deny i f the sub j e c t i s not on s h i f t .
4 . Permit i f the sub j e c t i s cu r r en t l y t r e a t i n g the owning
pat i en t .
5 . Permit i f the sub j e c t i s o f the emergency department .
6 . Deny otherwi se .
Listing 1.1. A running example of six access control rules from an industrial e-health
case study [6]. The application is a patient monitoring system and the rules are specified
by the hospital that employs the system. The first rule for which the condition holds
should provide the overall decision.
take the access rules of Listing 1.1. These rules are taken from an industrial
e-health case study, i.e., a system provided to hospitals for monitoring patients
at their homes [6]. These six rules are only an excerpt of the complete set of
rules, but already require the concepts of ownership, patient consent, the pa-
tient status, breaking-the-glass procedures, the departments of the hospital and
the treating relationship between physicians and patients. Moreover, these rules
should be combined correctly, in this case being that the first rule for which the
condition holds should provide the overall decision. As a result, current applica-
tions require a policy language in which a wide spectrum of rules can easily be
expressed and combined into one unambiguous composite policy.
Of the current policy languages, XACML [1] partially achieves this. Firstly,
by employing attribute-based access control (ABAC, [11]), XACML supports
most of the rules required by the case study. Secondly, by employing policy trees
(see Figure 1), XACML supports structuring multiple rules and reasoning about
how these relate in case of conflict. However, XACML does not allow to specify
and manage large policies effectively. In the example rules of Listing 1.1, the
roles of a subject are a well-known access control concept [7], the concept of
patient consent is specific to the domain of e-health, the status of a patient is
specific to the patient monitoring system and the departments are specific to the
hospital. Ideally, these concepts are defined once as patterns that can be reused
within their respective domains. Moreover, each pattern is ideally defined by
its respective expert, i.e., an access control expert, an e-health domain expert,
the application provider or an expert of the hospital. In terms of attribute-based
policies, such patterns would consist of rules and the definitions of the attributes
required by these rules. However, XACML does not support attribute definitions
and only allows to include other policies without modification such that slight
variations cannot be modularized in a single pattern.
To address these limitations, this paper introduces policy templates in
attribute-based tree-structured policies as part of a novel policy language called
198 M. Decat et al.
Fig. 1. Example of a policy tree that combines the six rules of the introduction. The
leafs of the tree are rules. The intermediate nodes are policies that specify a target and
the combination algorithm to combine the results of their children.
the Simple Tree-structured Attribute-based Policy Language or STAPL. Policy
templates are policies containing unbound variables that can be bound to val-
ues, expressions, rules or even other policies when instantiating the template
later on. In addition, STAPL allows to package these templates in reusable pol-
icy modules. More precisely, STAPL supports four types of policy templates of
increasing expressiveness:
1. simple policy references, which include other policies without modification,
2. simple policy templates, which include variations of policies by extending
policy references with unbound variables,
3. modules of policy templates with attribute definitions, which encapsulate pol-
icy templates and the definitions of the attributes they require,
4. modules of policy templates with specialized types of attributes, which extend
STAPL with specialized attributes and functions that reason about them.
This paper illustrates how these policy templates and modules can be used to
modularize access control patterns and thereby increase policy comprehensibility,
facilitate policy reuse and facilitate separation of concerns between the different
stakeholders in policy specification.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 further illustrates the
problem statement of this work. Section 3 describes STAPL and the different
types of policy templates it supports. Section 4 validates the potential of policy
templates. Section 5 discusses related work and puts the results in a broader
perspective. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Context and Problem Illustration
Policy-based access control is an approach to access control in which the access
rules are specified in declarative policies that are enforced and evaluated by
specialized components in the application. As such, the access rules can vary
and evolve separately from the application code and both can be specified by
their respective experts, a principle called separation of concerns [14].
Over the last decades, multiple models have been proposed to reason about
access control and specify access control policies. The state of the art supports
a wide range of complex rules by combining two technologies: attribute-based
Improving Reuse of Attribute-Based Access Control Policies 199
Fig. 2. Our vision on policy specification: an application security expert should be able
to specify policies for his or her specific organization and application by instantiating
policy patterns represented as templates pre-defined by other experts
access control (ABAC, [11]) and policy trees. Firstly, ABAC is a recent access
control model that expresses rules in terms of key-value properties of the subject,
the resource and the environment called attributes. Examples of such attributes
are the subject roles, the resource location and the time. As such, ABAC sup-
ports rules such as identity-based permissions, roles, ownership, time, location,
consent and breaking-the-glass procedures. Secondly, the most widely-used lan-
guage for attribute-based policies XACML [1] additionally allows to combine
multiple attribute-based rules in a single policy as a tree, a concept also present
in the literature (e.g., [4,12]). As illustrated in Figure 1, each element in such a
policy tree defines to which requests it applies and how the results of its children
should be combined, e.g., a permit overrides a deny. As said, these technologies
together support a wide range of rules. However, specifying complex rules such
as the patient consent rule (Rule 2 of Listing 1.1) using these technologies is not
trivial. Consequently, managing large sets of such rules is even more challenging.
Modularization and reuse are key to managing this complexity effectively. To
illustrate this, again take the example rules from Listing 1.1. Parts of these rules
are well-known access control concepts such as the roles of a subject, while other
parts are specific to the domain of e-health, specific to the application or specific
to the hospital. Ideally, these parts are specified once by their respective experts
as patterns that can be reused in multiple policies of their respective domains:
– An access control expert defines patterns for well-known access control con-
cepts, such as ownership and hierarchical roles. These patterns can then be
reused in any access control policy.
– An e-health domain expert defines patterns for frequent e-health rules, such
as patient consent and the breaking-the-glass procedure in the example rules.
These patterns can then be reused in any e-health policy.
– An application provider defines patterns for rules and attributes specific to
its application, such as the status of a patient in the example rules. These
patterns can be reused in any policy that applies to this application.
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– A security expert of the hospital defines patterns for hospital-specific rules
and attributes, such as the shifts of nurses and the departments of the hos-
pital in the example rules. These patterns can be reused in policies for any
application employed by the hospital.
After these patterns have been defined, the application security expert of the
hospital can specify the policy for this hospital and his or her specific application
by simply instantiating these patterns. This vision is illustrated in Figure 2.
However, the state of the art with XACML does not support such patterns.
More precisely, the patterns in the examples above consist of five types of defini-
tions: (1) rules that can be included in other policies without modification, e.g.,
the rule that checks patient consent, (2) rules that can be included in other poli-
cies with slight modifications, e.g., the rule that checks whether the subject is on
shift, in which the shift hours should be specified by the hospital, (3) attributes
that are required by these rules, e.g., the owner of a resource or the current time,
(4) attributes that can be used by other rules later on, e.g., the roles of a subject
or the status of a patient, and (5) the possible values of a certain attribute, e.g,
the departments of the hospital and the roles of the employees in the hospital.
Of these five types, XACML only allows the first, i.e., to include other policies
literally by using policy references. The more advanced ALFA language for gen-
erating XACML policies [8] does support attribute definitions as well, but is still
limited to including policies without modification.
To address these limitations, this paper introduces policy templates in attri-
bute-based tree-structured policies as part of a novel policy language called
STAPL. Policy templates are partially specified policies that contain unbound
variables that can be specified later on. STAPL additionally supports encapsulat-
ing these policy templates with the definitions of the attributes they require into
self-contained policy modules. Policy templates have been put forward in formal
work about policies trees [2] and were part of the Ponder policy language [5],
both more than a decade ago. However, policy templates have not been applied
in state-of-the-art policy languages of which the complexity actually increases
the need for them.
3 Policy Templates in STAPL
This paper introduces policy templates in attribute-based tree-structured poli-
cies as part of a policy language called STAPL1. More precisely, STAPL supports
(1) simple policy references, (2) simple policy templates, (3) modules of policy
templates with the definitions of the attributes they require and (4) the extension
of the previous with specialized types of attributes. This section first introduces
STAPL and then discusses each of these.
STAPL Basics. STAPL is a policy language designed to easily specify
attribute-based tree-structured policies. In other words, STAPL takes on a pol-
icy model similar to XACML, but is designed for easier specification (amongst
1 The code of STAPL publicly is available at https://github.com/stapl-dsl/
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1 act i on . i d = SimpleAttr ibute ( Str ing )
2 r e s ou r c e . owner = SimpleAttr ibute ( Str ing )
3 sub j e c t . t r e a t i n g = L i s tAt t r i bu t e ( Str ing )
4 sub j e c t . r o l e s = L i s tAt t r i bu t e ( Str ing )
5 environment . now = SimpleAttr ibute (Time)
6 . . .
7 Policy := when ( act i on . i d == ”view” and r e s ou r c e . type ==
8 ” pa t i e n t s t a t u s ”) apply F i r s tApp l i c ab l e to (
9 Rule := deny i f f (not ”nurse ” in s ub j e c t . r o l e s ) ,
10 Policy := apply PermitOverr ides to (
11 Rule := deny i f f ( s ub j e c t . i d in
12 r e s ou r c e . owner withdrawn consents ) ,
13 Rule := permit i f f ( r e s ou r c e . p a t i e n t s t a t u s == ”bad ”) ,
14 Rule := permit i f f ( s ub j e c t . t r i g g e r e d b r e a k i n g g l a s s )
15 per forming ( l og ( sub j e c t . i d + ” broke the g l a s s ”))
16 ) ,
17 Rule := deny i f f (not ( environment . now >= 08 :00 and
18 environment . now <= 17 :00 ) ) ,
19 Rule := permit i f f ( r e s ou r c e . owner in s ub j e c t . t r e a t i n g ) ,
20 Rule := permit i f f ( s ub j e c t . department == ”emergency ”) ,
21 Rule := deny
22 )
Listing 1.2. The STAPL definition of the example rules of Listing 1.1 without the use
of policy templates
1 // example d e f i n i t i o n s
2 def defaul tDeny = Rule := deny
3 def denyIfNotOnShi ft = Rule := deny i f f (
4 not ( environment . now >= 08 :00 and environment . now <= 17 :00 ) )
5 def permi t I fTreat ing = Rule := permit i f f (
6 r e s ou r c e . owner in s ub j e c t . t r e a t i n g )
7 // example usage
8 act i on . i d = SimpleAttr ibute ( Str ing )
9 . . .
10 Policy := when ( . . . ) apply F i r s tApp l i c ab l e to (
11 . . .
12 denyIfNotOnShift ,
13 permi t I fTreat ing ,
14 . . .
15 defaul tDeny
16 )
Listing 1.3. Example definitions and usage of policy references
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others). Listing 1.2 shows the STAPL specification of the example rules of List-
ing 1.1. As shown, the attributes to be used in the policy are defined first (lines
1-6). These attributes have a type and can be single-valued or multi-valued. Then
the policy is defined in terms of these attributes (lines 7-22). STAPL employs
policy trees consisting of Policies and Rules: Rules are the basic elements of a
STAPL policy and Policies are collections of multiple Rules or other Policies.
Every Policy specifies to which requests it applies by means of an attribute-
based target (following the keyword when, see lines 7-8) and specifies how to
combine the results of its children by means of a combination algorithm such as
PermitOverrides or FirstApplicable. STAPL is defined as an internal domain-
specific language (DSL) in Scala because of its powerful features for both DSLs
and modularity. Of the different features of STAPL, this paper only focuses on
the policy templates, which are explained next.
Simple Policy References. Policy references are the simplest type of policy
templates provided by STAPL. Similar to XACML, policy references allow poli-
cies to be reused without modification and do not include attribute definitions.
Listing 1.3 illustrates how to define a policy reference (lines 2-6) and use one
(lines 10-16). As shown, policy references are Scala functions (denoted by the
keyword def) that do not require arguments and return a STAPL Rule or Policy.
Simple Policy Templates. Policy templates extend policy references with
unbound variables. These unbound variables can be literal values, attribute ref-
erences, attribute-based expressions or even other Rules or Policies. Listing 1.4
illustrates how to define a policy template (lines 2-9) and use one (lines 11-
18). The first example generalizes denyIfNotOnShift of Listing 1.3, the second
encapsulates the pattern of permitting in a certain condition and denying oth-
erwise. As shown, policy templates are Scala functions that require arguments
and return a STAPL Rule or Policy.
Modules of Policy TemplateswithAttributeDefinitions. Thirdly, STAPL
supports encapsulating policy templates with the definitions of the attributes re-
quired by these templates. This decreases the chance for incorrect attribute def-
initions and fully encapsulates a policy pattern as a reusable and self-contained
module. Listing 1.5 illustrates how to define such a policy module (lines 2-12). As
shown, a policy module is a Scala trait that extends the trait BasicPolicy. A Scala
trait is similar to a class, but allowsmultiple inheritance. The trait BasicPolicy de-
fines the variables subject, resource, action and environment so that policy mod-
ules can assign attributes to them. Listing 1.5 also illustrates how to import the
defined modules, i.e., by extending the scope in which the policies are defined us-
ing the Scala traits (line 14). Since Scala allows multiple inheritance using traits,
the scope can be extended with any number of required modules. Moreover, since
Scala allows traits to extend other traits, policy modules can extend existing mod-
ules as well. Amongst others, this can be used to express that a certain module
depends on other modules, as illustrated by the Treating module (line 9).
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1 // example d e f i n i t i o n s
2 def denyIfNotOnShift ( s t a r t : Time , s t op : Time ) =
3 Rule := deny i f f (not ( environment . now >= s t a r t
4 and environment . now <= stop ) )
5 def denyUnless ( c on d i t i o n : Expr ) =
6 Policy := apply PermitOverr ides to (
7 Rule := permit i f f ( cond i t i on ) ,
8 defaultDeny // see L i s t i n g 1.3
9 )
10 // example usage
11 act ion . id = SimpleAttr ibute ( S t r ing )
12 . . .
13 Policy := when ( . . . ) apply PermitOverr ides to (
14 . . .
15 denyIfNotOnShift (08 :00 , 17 :00 ) ,
16 . . .
17 denyUnless ( sub j e c t . department == ”emergency ”)
18 )
Listing 1.4. Example definitions and usage of policy templates
1 // example d e f i n i t i o n s
2 tra i t Sh i f t s extends Bas i cPo l i cy {
3 environment . now = SimpleAttr ibute (Time)
4 def denyIfNotOnShift ( . . . ) = . . . // see L i s t i n g 1.4
5 }
6 tra i t Ownership extends Bas i cPo l i cy {
7 r e s ou r c e . owner = SimpleAttr ibute ( Str ing )
8 }
9 tra i t Treating extends Ownership {
10 sub j e c t . t r e a t i n g = L i s tAt t r i bu t e ( Str ing )
11 def permi t I fTreat ing = . . . // see L i s t i n g 1.3
12 }
13 // example usage
14 object example extends Bas i cPo l i cy with Sh i f t s with Treating {
15 // no t i c e : no a t t r i b u t e d e f i n i t i o n s here
16 Policy := when ( . . . ) apply PermitOverr ides to (
17 . . .
18 denyIfNotOnShift (08 :00 , 17 : 00 ) ,
19 permi t I fTreat ing ,
20 . . .
21 )
22 }
Listing 1.5. Example definitions and usage of policy modules that contain both policy
templates as well as the definitions of the attributes they require
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1 . . . // d e f i n i t i o n o f the r o l e a t t r i b u t e omi t ted
2 // example d e f i n i t i o n o f the r o l e h i e rarchy
3 val employee = new Role ( )
4 val nurse = new Role ( employee )
5 val headNurse = new Role ( nurse )
6 . . .
7 // example usage
8 Policy := when ( . . . ) apply PermitOverr ides to (
9 // t h i s a p p l i e s to a l l t ypes o f nurses
10 Rule := deny i f f (not sub j e c t . hasRole ( nurse ) )
11 )
Listing 1.6. Example usage of a specialized attribute type for hierarchical roles. The
definition of this attribute type required 35 lines of code and is omitted because of
space limitations. Notice that subject has been extended with a specialized function
to reason about hierarchical roles.
Policy Templates with Specialized Attributes. Finally, policy modules
can extend the core functionality of STAPL (i.e., single-valued or multi-valued
attributes of simple types such as numbers, strings, booleans or dates, and
simple operators such as ==, in and <=) with specialized types of attributes
and functions that reason about these attributes. This functionality can be used
to express for example hierarchical roles. In this case, the application security
expert would like to define the hierarchy of roles and test whether a subject
owns a certain role in this hierarchy. Listing 1.6 shows an example of how such
an attribute could be used. For space reasons, Listing 1.6 omitted the definition
of this specialized attribute, which consists of the definitions of the attribute
itself, the mapping of these attributes to STAPL expressions and the extensions
to subject, resource, action and environment (35 lines of code in total). This
shows that policy modules with specialized attributes are the most expressive
type of policy patterns offered by STAPL, but also the most complex.
4 Validation
The previous section discussed the different types of policy templates supported
by STAPL. This section validates whether they can be used to create reusable
policy modules and that these modules can be used to separate the different
stakeholders involved in policy specification.
4.1 Approach
To validate the potential of policy templates, we applied them to an existing
policy by consistently factoring out rules and attribute definitions into policy
modules. Afterwards, we validated whether each resulting policy module falls
within the expertise of a single stakeholder and that each module can be reused
within its respective domain. If so, this shows that policy templates can separate
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the different stakeholders in policy specification, enable reuse and that realistic
policies can be specified by instantiating such templates. Of course, this process
is mainly meant for validation purposes and STAPL aims for a situation in which
policies are specified using policy templates from the start.
The original policy applies to viewing the status of a patient monitored by a
patient monitoring system. This policy was specified by the authors before the
work on STAPL as part of the e-health case study that was also employed in
the running example of Listing 1.1 [6]. The different stakeholders in this policy
are the five stakeholders identified before: the general access control expert,
the e-health domain expert, the application provider, the security expert of the
hospital and the application security expert of the hospital.
The policy was originally specified in XACML and was first translated to
STAPL literally to achieve a fair evaluation2. In terms of STAPL, the policy
consists of 23 Rules (plus 7 default denies) divided over 12 Policies, resulting in
a policy tree of depth 5. The policy requires 30 different attributes, of which 17
subject attributes, 11 resource attributes, 1 action attribute and 1 environment
attribute.
4.2 Modularization Results
The result of the modularization of the policy is shown in Figure 3. We can make
several interesting observations from this figure.
Observation 1: Separation of concerns. Firstly, Figure 3 shows that it is possible
to apply policy templates so that every policy module can be specified by exactly
one expert. As a result, the different roles of the different experts outlined above
can be separated appropriately:
1. The access control expert specifies the general policy modules such as Roles,
Time, Ownership, Location and GeneralTemplates. GeneralTemplates amongst
others contains the definitions of defaultDeny and denyUnless() shown in
Listing 1.3 and Listing 1.4. Roles defines the specialized attribute for hier-
archical roles.
2. The domain expert specifies the policy modules that apply to the domain of
e-health in general, which in this case is Consent and BreakingGlass.
3. The application provider specifies the policy modules that are specific to
the application, in this case mainly PatientMonitoringSystem, which de-
fines the resource attributes supported by the application. Of these at-
tributes, resource.patient status represents a gradation of patient statuses.
This specialized attribute has been generalized into the separate module
PatientStatus that can be reused by the application provider later on.
4. The security expert of the hospital defines the policy modules that are spe-
cific to the hospital. These comprise the role hierarchy of the employees of
the hospital, its different departments, the definitions of 13 attributes that
2 The original policy and the result of the refactoring are available at
https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/stapl/
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Fig. 3. The hierarchy of policy modules resulting from refactoring the original policy
of the e-health case study. Arrows represent a dependency between policy templates
and the colors indicate which policy template fits the expertise of which stakeholder.
apply to its employees (e.g., subject.department and subject.is discharged)
and the rules to reason about shifts and the treating relationship between
medical personnel and patients. Again, the latter have been generalized into
separate modules that can be reused within the hospital.
5. Finally, the application security expert only specifies the specific policy that
holds for the patient monitoring system as used by the hospital. There was
no need to define other attributes, i.e., all attributes used by this policy were
pre-defined in policy modules.
Observation 2: Reusability. As a second observation, the modules defined by
the different experts indeed apply to their own domain and can thus be reused
in these domains. For example, the templates in the modules defined by the
application provider can be reused by any organization using its application and
the templates in the modules defined by the access control expert can be reused
in other access control policies regardless of the application or the domain.
Observation 3: Number of policy modules. Thirdly, Figure 3 shows that it was
possible to extract no less than 14 modules from a policy consisting of 23 rules.
This shows how common reusable patterns are in access control policies and
indicates the potential of policy templates for simplifying policy specification.
However, we do not expect the number of modules that can be extracted from
a larger policy to grow linearly with the number of rules in that policy. On the
contrary, given the reusability of the extracted modules discussed in the previous
observation, we expect the number of defined modules to stagnate, but the reuse
of the templates in these modules to grow.
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Observation 4: Fine-Grained Module Hierarchy. Finally, it is worth noting that
most of the 14 modules only define a small number of templates and attributes.
By employing module dependencies, these fine-grained templates can then be
structured in a hierarchy of modules of gradually increasing size in order to only
include the specific features needed in the final policy.
4.3 Analysis of the Modules
In addition to the resulting module hierarchy, it is also interesting to analyze
the different types of templates used in this hierarchy. More precisely, the 14
modules of Figure 3 define 2 policy references (defaultDeny and defaultPermit),
6 policy templates (e.g., DenyUnless() and denyIfNotOnShift()), 30 definitions
of standard attributes, 3 definitions of specialized attributes (roles, hierarchi-
cal resource types and the status of a patient) and 3 functions for using these
specialized attributes. The final policy did not define any other attributes and
instantiated 0 policy references, 9 policy templates and 9 functions for using the
specialized attributes3. These numbers show four interesting observations:
Observation 1: references vs templates. Apart from defaultDeny and default-
Permit, all other templates required unbound variables in order to be reusable.
This validates the original claim that policy references by themselves are not
powerful enough to provide reusability.
Observation 2: template definition vs instantiation. The number of template
instantiations is significantly higher than the number of template definitions.
This is mainly due to the use of roles (7x) and DenyUnless() (6x) throughout the
policy. Both patterns frequently occurred in the policy, while the other templates
are more specialized and were used only once. In the former case, modularization
provides the benefit of specifying a frequent pattern only once; in the latter case
the benefit is having other experts specify complex rules and instantiating these
using a simple interface.
Observation 3: no attribute definitions in the application policy. Finally, we ob-
serve that all attributes required by the final application policy are defined in
the modules and that the policy did not define any attributes itself. This fits
reality well: a policy cannot simply define a new attribute since the available
resource attributes are determined by the application and defining a new sub-
ject attribute requires assigning values for this attribute to the subjects of the
organization. In fact, policy modules provide a means to actually consolidate
these definitions in both an application-specific or organization-specific module.
4.4 Effect of Templates on the Policy Size
Finally, Table 1 provides metrics about the effect of policy templates on the size
of a policy. Table 1 first compares the number of lines of code required to express
3 The final policy did not employ any policy references because defaultDeny and
defaultPermit were encapsulated in DenyUnless() and PermitUnless().
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Table 1. Metrics about the size of the policy without and with policy templates
Without With
#Lines of code for policy definition 57 56 (98.2%)
#Statements in the policy definition 367 205 (55.6%)
the policy (not counting attribute definitions). As shown, the use of policy tem-
plates does not significantly affect this number. However, as shown next in the
table, the use of policy templates does significantly lower the number of state-
ments required to express the policy (e.g., Policy, when, ==). This is the result
of replacing complex rules or frequently occurring patterns with templates that
require less statements to instantiate, such as the consent rule or DenyUnless() re-
spectively. While these numbers only comprise one case study, they do show that
policy templates have the ability to simplify policy specification significantly.
5 Related Work and Discussion
In the previous sections, we introduced and validated policy templates in
attribute-based tree-structured policy languages as a means to improve reuse
and modularity. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to discuss
policy templates in the domain of attribute-based access control. Before this
work, policy templates have also been discussed by Wies et al. [17], Casassa
Mont et al. [3], Bonatti et al. [2] and as part of the Ponder policy language [5].
Similar to our vision, Wies et al. and Casassa Mont et al. discuss policy tem-
plates as part of a larger view on policy management in which templates are a
means to allow different experts to cooperate. Bonatti et al. on the other hand
discuss policy templates as part of their formal work on modular policy compo-
sition using policy trees. As a result, our definition of policy templates aligns to
theirs, but fits in the vision of Wies and Casassa Mont. Finally, Ponder is an ex-
tensive policy language that amongst others also supports policies with unbound
variables, but did not yet employ attribute-based access control or policy trees.
The main difference between this work and these four is our focus on attribute-
based tree-structured policy templates supported by a concrete policy language,
the generalization of policy templates into policy modules and the validation of
the potential of policy templates. In addition to these authors, templates have
also been discussed in the evolution from role-based access control (RBAC, [7])
to ABAC (e.g., [9,13]). Such role templates were eventually generalized into
attribute-based policies, for which STAPL in turn introduces policy templates.
This work started from the observation that state-of-the-art attribute-based
policy languages can express a wide range of rules, but that policy specifica-
tion has also become more complex. This observation aligns to recent visions of
amongst others Sandhu [16]. Sandhu argues that attribute-based access control
can offer numerous benefits, but also provides risks and challenges such as the in-
creased complexity of attribute management. Similarly, NIST recently published
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a guide to ABAC [10] containing open challenges and a vision on the multiple
roles involved in employing ABAC in an enterprise. This work fits into both
visions with a specific focus on efficient policy management and specification.
However, when scoping this work in the visions of Sandhu and NIST, it also
becomes clear that policy templates are only a first step to an effective deploy-
ment of ABAC. For example, while STAPL allows to simply import an attribute
definition, the largest effort will be in providing values for this attribute for the
appropriate subjects or resources. Therefore, the next step for this work is to
extend modular policy management with modular attribute management.
An interesting side-effect of our work on policy modularity is the possibility to
explicitly separate the roles of the provider of an application and the organiza-
tion using it (see Figure 3). In terms of attribute-based policies, the application
provider determines the structure of the resources in the application, i.e., the
types of resources, their attributes and the actions they support. The organiza-
tion on the other hand determines the structure of the subjects, i.e., the types
of subjects and their attributes. The policies then combine both by express-
ing which subjects can perform which actions on which resources. As shown in
our validation, policy templates provide a means to concretize the structure of
the subjects and the resources, which can prove valuable to simplify the cor-
rect specification of access rules, for example by employing this information for
completeness checking. Towards the future, we plan to further investigate this
application of policy templates.
Finally, we want to mention that STAPL is currently built as a Scala DSL.
Scala provides powerful features for both DSLs and modularity and allows
STAPL to be directly employed in Scala or Java applications. However, in the
long run, it is our aspiration that the concepts presented in this paper are in-
corporated in language-independent policy languages, such as XACML itself.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced policy templates as a means to improve reuse in
attribute-based tree-structured policy languages such as XACML. Our policy
language STAPL supports four types of policy templates ranging from simple
policy references to modules encapsulating policy templates and the specialized
attributes required by these templates. This paper showed that these policy tem-
plates can be used to set up a hierarchy of fine-grained reusable policy modules.
Each such module can encapsulate a policy pattern, can be defined by the ap-
propriate expert and can be reused within the domain of that expert. As such, it
is our aspiration that STAPL is a first step towards a policy specification process
in which policy modules are defined once by experts and access control policies
are composed by instantiating these modules.
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